The fangs speak for themselves

I've heard and read many things about the possible visit of Israeli deputy prime minister Shaul Mofaz to Ramallah to meet with President Mahmoud Abbas. I must highlight, however, many of those who voiced their opinion are not only doing so to protest the visit, but to use the opportunity to attack President Abbas, with many accusing him of treachery and other foolish and ignorant claims.

One thing that definitely convinced me of this was saying Shaul Mofaz "was one of those who planned for the siege on late president Yasser Arafat." While that is true, I must remind those who forgot that these SAME people threw the SAME accusations at Yasser Arafat before his death and before the siege. Did he not meet the likes of Benjamin Netanyahu, Ariel Sharon, Shaul Mofaz, Ehud Barak, and Shimon Peres before? Is this the first ever meeting between the Palestinian president and Israeli figures? Then why the hypocrisy? Why do some make it seem like they always loved Yasser Arafat? As if they are defending his honor?

Still, we hear more of "these are negotiations", I don't see how this meeting can be considered in any way "negotiations", as President Abbas's position regarding negotiations remain perfectly clear (settlement freeze, recognition of previously agreed-upon declarations), other than the fact that Mofaz has no negotiating authority as deputy prime minister. Meetings and negotiations are two separate things with different purposes.

Have we thought for a moment that maybe the president wanted to prove a point given the world's demand that both sides meet (maybe he knows this meeting will not produce anything and again the ball is in Israel's court to abide by its obligations)? What if we somehow have prisoners released from this meeting, although chances are slim, even if there is a 1% chance, should we turn our backs on our prisoners?

Why do so many of these people pretend like they care? I will give this a week or two and it will be as if it never happened (need I remind you of the Goldstone report, many are probably asking themselves "oh, yes, what ever happened to that??"). Most of the organizers of any protest are sleeping until things like this come up. Since we are speaking about the organizers, it's no secret they belong to opposition groups (not "independents", as they claim) looking for any excuse to resort to slander and defamation (pay close attention to how the opposition is always the first to come out to the media).

I laugh when these people think they're doing a lot when all they do is talk behind a computer screen through Facebook, "like"-ing a page, or sharing an event or article does not mean you are accomplishing extraordinary things. Don't be fooled when you see 1,000+ people "attending" a protest, no more than 100 actually show up.

Looking at the protests in Ramallah, which still took place after the meeting was cancelled, it seemed clear some were there to start clashes instead of actually protesting. What else can the opposition do when they're stuck in the corner? Play the role of the victim. The only videos/photos we see are only in the beginning (how they make it seem it will be non-violent with no bad intentions) and then the videos/photos all of a sudden fast-forward to the end when we see a few injuries, without knowing what happened in the middle. The plan of these people is always to be ready with cameras, provoke a clash with the police, take pictures and distribute them, it's organized crime. Manipulation at its best.


One thing I am aware of, I believe this is applicable anywhere in the world, is an attempt to physically attack the police gives the police the green light to take action. Keep this in mind.


If only protests against Israel were like this. Are there not enough settlements, land confiscations, daily arrests to shift our attention to Israel? 


Never have I seen these organizers protest against Hamas for continuously delaying elections (assuming elections are what they are looking for). Never have I seen a sign carried that criticized Hamas even slightly (ever heard of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend"?), as a matter of fact, they never even mention it! I challenge these "independents", to prove you do not have a hidden agenda, to go out in protest against Hamas's decision to block the Elections Committee from carrying on it's job preparing for elections.

I will consider myself mistaken if people stop this ugly campaign targeting President Abbas personally while directing their attacks on the people who ACTUALLY did the killing! We must learn the difference between criticism and intentional slander, the latter can never be described as "freedom of expression".

Just keep in mind, these voices you hear, are coming from a noisy minority looking for (as the Arabic saying goes) "a wedding to drum and toot in."

To finish off, I want to pay tribute to the 700+ prisoners belonging to the Palestinian security forces in Israeli jails, and hundreds of other security personnel killed by Israel over the past few years, and we should not forget the hundreds of Palestinian police/security service offices and buildings destroyed by Israel as well. Then people say the security forces are here to defend Israel...shame on them.

For those trying to say they're not targeting the president, please don't try too hard, the fangs coming out of your mouths speak for themselves.

Why President Abbas is right about going to the UN

This article was posted on Ma'an news, a Palestinian news agency, on October 14th. Written by John Quigley, a professor of law at Ohio State University, and Gabi Fahel, an international lawyer and former adviser to Palestinian ministers and negotiators on issues concerning Palestine's membership of international organizations:

"President Mahmoud Abbas' decision to request UN membership for Palestine at the Security Council is the right decision. 

It is the right decision if you believe in two states. It is the right decision if you believe in one state. It is the wrong decision if you believe in the status quo.

The status quo is the continuing occupation of Palestine and its people, daily human rights violations, denial of access to Jerusalem and Palestinian holy sites, as well as settlement construction without end. The status quo also means no tangible remedy for Palestinian refugees. 

Abbas has clearly exhausted every bilateral avenue to responsibly move the peace process forward and he has now prudently reached the conclusion that international consensus is not enough. He has concluded that it is now time for active international engagement beyond the confines of the bilateral negotiations box. 

Even if one believes in one state in historic Palestine, the initiative at the United Nations for membership must first be exhausted before a credible case can be made for one state. Therefore, the attempt at UN membership is a necessary step for achieving a two-state or one-state solution. 

Today there are at least 127 states recognizing the sovereignty of Palestine. The initiative to seek bilateral recognitions from South America was the first warning to an otherwise unresponsive Israeli administration that Abbas was not going "to come down from the tree." 

The response in diplomatic circles was that the president was not serious: "The Palestinian leadership will do as the Americans tell them, and they will buckle as they always do." This assumption was an incorrect one.

Moreover, the Israelis were now dealing with a president who publicly announced that he was not seeking re-election. Abbas was empowering the Palestine national cause as his legacy. With the Arab Spring and other political shifts in the region, it was time for Israel, at a minimum, to come down from its tree with a settlement freeze in line with the international consensus on that issue reflected in the 2003 Roadmap. It did not. 

The next warning signal came in May. The president announced that Palestine was planning on going to the United Nations. Again, diplomats did not take Abbas seriously: "The Palestinian leadership will do as the Americans tell them, and they will buckle as they always do." Again, that assumption was incorrect.

Up until September, relevant capitals were still not taking the president's determination to seek Palestine's membership seriously. Public statements and backroom negotiations were taking place to persuade Abbas not to proceed, without proposing any meaningful alternatives to persuade Israel to implement a genuine settlement freeze. 

The Palestine membership application may not proceed to a vote in the Security Council any time soon. The US is likely to play an obstructionist role. Palestine's membership application may be "studied" by a Security Council committee for months if not years. 

If it is sent to a vote, the US may succeed in ensuring that no favorable recommendation is made to the General Assembly for Palestine’s admission to membership. At that point, the General Assembly may take time to study the Security Council action and may then seek clarification from the Security Council on why Palestine does not meet the requirements for membership. 

What will become very clear is that US opposition at the Security Council is contrary to international law and contrary to international political consensus. When this is made clear, it becomes debatable whether the General Assembly may ignore the Security Council's recommendation and admit Palestine as a member state.

While Palestine's membership application may take time to make its way through the Security Council and General Assembly, Palestine could benefit by securing Observer State status for its UN mission. The General Assembly has the power to confer such status and would be likely to vote overwhelmingly in favor. Only a simple majority vote is required for an upgrade. 

An upgrade to Observer State status for Palestine will make clear, if it is not so already, that the General Assembly considers Palestine qualified for UN membership on the criterion of statehood. This will make it more difficult for Security Council members to assert that Palestine is not a state. 

And if the Security Council fails to adopt a favorable recommendation, the upgrade to Observer State status will pre-determine that issue when the membership application reaches the General Assembly, thereby arguably making it easier for the General Assembly to admit Palestine in the face of no favorable recommendation from the Security Council.

By obtaining an upgrade to Observer State, Palestine could advance permanent status issues in international venues, especially in the face of Israel's refusal to negotiate bilaterally in good faith. Prominently, the maintenance of settlements in occupied territory -- one of the sticking points in the final status negotiations -- is a war crime. Confirmation by the General Assembly of Palestine's statehood would make it clear to the International Criminal Court that Palestine’s 2009 declaration conferring jurisdiction on the Court is valid. 

The settlement issue would no longer be solely a matter of bilateral negotiation. Beyond negotiating with Palestine, Israeli officials might have to negotiate their way out of potential criminal liability.

Another example: Last year the Minister of Tourism and Palestine’s Ambassador to UNESCO began the process for membership in UNESCO. Accession to UNESCO prior to Palestine’s admission to the U.N. would require a two-thirds majority in a vote of the UNESCO membership, but that would not be a problem. 

Accession to UNESCO would allow for the internationalization of issues relating to Jerusalem. Israel would have to negotiate with an international body, under clear international rules, over its illegal excavations and construction in one of the world's most important heritage sites.

Palestine would also be able to seek world heritage recognition and protection for additional sites in Bethlehem, Hebron and Nablus. 

A confirmation of Palestine statehood via an upgrade to Observer State would also improve Palestine’s chances for membership in the International Telecommunications Union. Like UNESCO membership, ITU membership for Palestine would require a two-thirds majority in a vote, but again this would not be a problem. 

Participation in the ITU would mean international regulation of Palestine's airwaves and frequencies. That regulation would be legally wrested from Israel's control. The electromagnetic sphere is a natural resource being exploited by Israel's mobile companies and generating hundreds of millions of dollars in profits and tax revenues. 

Once the ITU regulates Palestine's frequencies, Israel will no longer be able to demand legal control over Palestine’s airwaves at the negotiation table and share prices for Israel's mobile companies would likely be reassessed.

Beyond these few examples, a confirmation of Palestine statehood could advance Palestinian access to dozens of international organizations governing such rights and responsibilities as human rights protection, underground water, fiscal and monetary matters, maritime boundaries, natural gas off-shore Gaza, international post, agriculture, transportation, health, among many others. 

Pursuing these international avenues will not only maintain momentum behind the President's UN initiative, but will also give new momentum to Salam Fayyad's government's state-building plan in Palestine. 

In addition, such international efforts have the potential to create a serious challenge to an otherwise cost-free Israeli policy to continue its occupation and settlement enterprise. 

And Israel's allies could also be taken to task to reassess whether any good-will created during the Arab Spring should be used to extinguish Israel's diplomatic flare ups every few months at numerous international organizations. 

So is Abbas on the right side of history for seeking Palestine's international engagement? Absolutely. "


http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=428860

Why Palestine is Seeking UN Membership

The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in a sovereign state of their own on the 1967 borders (land occupied by Israel after the 1967 war) has been universally recognized by the international community. For two decades, the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization), the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, has undertaken to achieve these national aspirations peacefully through negotiations with Israel. However, Israel
’s refusal to halt illegal settlement activity is endangering the viability of the two-state solution.
Palestine meets the legal criteria for statehood. The fact that it has yet to establish effective control over all of its territory is a result of the continuation of Israel’s military occupation of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Israel has accused the Palestinians of taking a unilateral step by going to the UN, imagine? How is going to the most multilateral place on earth, the home of 193 countries, a unilateral step?

The 1967 border is consistent with the UN Security Council Resolution 242 which asserted that any attempt by Israel to acquire Palestinian territory by force is inadmissible and demanded Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied since 1967. The UN General Assembly Resolution 58/292 affirmed that “the status of the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, remains one of military occupation.”

According to Article 31 of the Interim Agreement of 1995 signed between the PLO and Israel, “neither side shall take any (unilateral) step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.”
For the past 15 years, Israel has violated this article by continuing to build settlements in the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem, thus altering the status of the oPt (occupied Palestinian territories), both physically and demographically, to prevent its return to Palestinians. Since 1995 alone, Israel has built approximately 50,000 settlement housing units and doubled the settler population to over 500,000 settlers.

According to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the transfer by the occupying power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies is prohibited.
Israel’s settlement policy and practices in the oPt, have been determined by the UN Security Council to have “a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.”
 
The PLO signed the Oslo Accords with the understanding that a sovereign Palestinian state would gain independence after a five year transition period. Article I of the DOP (Declaration of Principles) states "The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian self-governing authority for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338". However, almost 20 years have passed and Israel continues to expand Israeli settlements on land meant to form the basis for the Palestinian state. In fact, Palestinians face land confiscations, home evictions, and demolition orders at a greater rate today than they did before the peace process began.

Other UN violations by Israel include its rejection of the 'right of return' of over 5 million Palestinian refugees (UN resolution 194), restricting the freedom of movement and freedom of worship (not allowing Muslims and Christians to enter Jerusalem on days of worship), controlling water resources meant for Palestinian consumption, and holding over 6,000 Palestinian political prisoners.

During U.S. President Barack Obama’s speech at the UN General Assembly last September, President Obama expressed his hopes of seeing Palestine as a member at the UN by the next UN General Assembly session of September 2011, this comes in line with the Quartet’s (U.S, Russia, EU and UN) decision that the timeframe for negotiations between Palestine and Israel should last for one year (from September 2010 to September 2011). With Israel insisting on refusing to freeze settlement activity and its rejection of the frameworks of the negotiations, negotiations remain stalled.

The Palestinian bid for membership at the UN this September is not meant to isolate Israel, rather it is meant to revive the two-state solution. So I ask Canada (and the U.S.), given all these facts, why will you vote against Palestinian membership at the UN?

Seeking Membership at the United Nations

Palestinians are seeking membership at the United Nations, not recognition

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) declared its independence in 1988 and this remains the foundation for Palestine’s statehood. The premise of this state is derived from international law, such as United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 181 and 393, and the borders Palestinians seek recognition on are based on the internationally recognized borders of 1967, with mutually agreed upon modifications. Palestinians only seek to be accepted as a member state of the UN. Recognition is granted by states individually, and does not need to be re-affirmed collectively.

Seeking membership at the United Nations is not a unilateral step

A unilateral act is when a state singlehandedly decides how to act on an issue that impacts multiple states. A good example of a unilateral act would be a state that changes facts on the ground of an occupied land, through settlement expansion and illegal evictions, despite the objections of the global community. A people, with the support of over 120 sovereign States, turning to the world’s largest multinational forum toseek membership is by definition the antithesis of unilateralism.

Palestinians do not seek to de-legitimize Israel, they seek to legitimize Palestine

Seeking to attain statehood at the United Nations is not a maneuver to isolate or delegitimize Israel, rather than a vehicle to legitimize a Palestinian state that would hold internationally recognized borders. The process in which Palestinians aspire to become a sovereign and independent state is identical to the multilateral process that allowed for the creation of a free and independent state of Israel, which was recognized by the UN in 1948.

Seeking membership is not an alternative to negotiations

Pursuing membership at the United Nations reaffirms the chances of reaching a just and lasting past based on the terms of reference accepted by the international community as the base for putting an end to the conflict. The Palestinians are dedicated to engaging in negotiations. A comprehensive peace agreement will put an end to the conflict and all historical claims once and for all.

Seeking membership preserves the two-state solution

Palestinian efforts are aimed at preserving the two-state solution. It is evident that Israel’s continued illegal occupation of the Palestinian territories casts serious doubt on the intentions of the Netanyahu government to live side by side in peace with a future Palestinian state. The two-state solution corresponds to a universal declaration supported by the international community and more specifically, international bodies such as the World Bank and the United Nations have determined that the ongoing illegal occupation is the sole obstacle for Palestinian statehood.

Palestinians do not seek a confrontation with the United States

The United States Congress must carefully weigh the consequences of cutting off aid to the Palestinians. These measures will only threaten US national security interests and regional stability. Palestinians hope that the United States Congress will provide more support to the administration in its efforts to resume the political process, based on President Obama’s Middle East speech in May of this year. It must be stressed that such actions will not sway the Palestinians from pursuing their objectives to establish an independent sovereign Palestinian state, living side by side with the State of Israel in peace and security.

http://plodelegation.us/2011/08/factsheet-un-membership/

The untold story of the deal that shocked the Middle East

Written by English journalist Robert Fisk.

Secret meetings between Palestinian intermediaries, Egyptian intelligence officials, the Turkish foreign minister, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal – the latter requiring a covert journey to Damascus with a detour round the rebellious city of Deraa – brought about the Palestinian unity which has so disturbed both Israelis and the American government. Fatah and Hamas ended four years of conflict in May with an agreement that is crucial to the Paslestinian demand for a state.

A series of detailed letters, accepted by all sides, of which The Independent has copies, show just how complex the negotiations were; Hamas also sought – and received – the support of Syrian President Bachar al-Assad, the country’s vice president Farouk al-Sharaa and its foreign minister, Walid Moallem. Among the results was an agreement by Meshaal to end Hamas rocket attacks on Israel from Gaza – since resistance would be the right only of the state – and agreement that a future Palestinian state be based on Israel’s 1967 borders.

“Without the goodwill of all sides, the help of the Egyptians and the acceptance of the Syrians – and the desire of the Palestinians to unite after the start of the Arab Spring, we could not have done this,” one of the principal intermediaries, 75-year old Munib Masri, told me. It was Masri who helped to set up a ‘Palestinian Forum’ of independents after the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority and Hamas originally split after Hamas won an extraordinary election victory in 2006. “I thought the divisions that had opened up could be a catastrophe and we went for four years back and forth between the various parties,” Masri said. “Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) asked me several times to mediate. We opened meetings in the West Bank. We had people from Gaza. Everyone participated. We had a lot of capability.”

In three years, members of the Palestinian Forum made more than 12 trips to Damascus, Cairo, Gaza and Europe and a lot of initiatives were rejected. Masri and his colleagues dealt directly with Hamas’ Prime Minister Hanniyeh in Gaza. They took up the so-called ‘prisoner swap initiative’ of Marwan Barghouti, a senior Fatah leader in an Israeli jail; then in the winds of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, the youth of Palestine on 15 March demanded unity and an end to the rivalry of Fatah and Hamas. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu had always refused to talk to Abbas on the grounds that the Palestinians were not united. On the 16th, he made a speech saying that he was “thinking of going to Gaza”. Masri, who was present, stood on a chair and clapped.

“I thought Hamas would answer in a positive way,” he recalls. “But in the first two or three days after Abbas’ speech, it gave a rather negative response. He had wanted an immediate election and no dialogue. Hamas did not appreciate this.” Abbas went off to Paris and Moscow – to sulk, in the eyes of some of his associates. But the Forum did not give up.

“We wrote a document – we said we would go to see the Egyptians, to congratulate them upon their revolution. So we had two meetings with the Egyptian head of intelligence, Khaled Orabi – Orabi’s father was an army general at the time of King Farouk – and we met Mohamed Ibrahim, an officer in the intelligence department.” Ibrahim’s father had won renown in the 1973 war when he captured the highest ranking Israeli officer in Sinai. The delegation also met Ibrahim’s deputies, Nadr Aser and Yassir Azawi.

Seven people from each part of Palestine were to represent the team in Cairo. These are the names which will be in future Palestinian history books. From the West Bank, came Dr Hanna Nasser (head of Bir Zeit University and of the Palestinian central election committee); Dr Mamdouh Aker (the head of the human rights society); Mahdi Abdul-Hadi (chairman of a political society in Jerusalem); Hanni Masri (a political analyst); Iyad Masrouji (businessman in pharmacuticals); Hazem Quasmeh (runs an NGO) and Munib Masri himself.

The Gaza ‘side’ were represented by Eyad Sarraj (who in the event could not go to Cairo because he was ill); Maamoun Abu Shahla (member of the board of Palestine Bank); Faysal Shawa (businessman and landowner); Mohsen Abu Ramadan (writer); Rajah Sourani (head of Arab human rights, who did not go to Cairo); ‘Abu Hassan’ (Islamic Jihad member who was sent by Sarraj); and Sharhabil Al-Zaim (a Gaza lawyer).

“These men spent time with the top brass of the Egyptian ‘mukhabarat’ intelligence service,” Masri recalls. “We met them on 10 April but we sent a document before we arrived in Cairo. This is what made it important. In Gaza, there were two different ‘sides’. So we talked about the micro-situation, about Gazans in the ‘jail’ of Gaza, we talked about human rights, the Egyptian blockade, about dignity. Shawa was saying ‘we feel we do not have dignity – and we feel it’s your fault.’ Nadr Asr of the intelligence department said: ‘We’re going to change all that.’

“At 7.0 pm, we came back and saw Khaled Orabi again. I told him: ‘Look, I need these things from you. Do you like the new initiative, a package that’s a win-win situation for everyone? Is the Palestinian file still ‘warm’ in Cairo? He said ‘It’s a bit long – but we like it. Can you pressure both Fatah and Hamas, to bring them in? But we will work with you. Go and see Fatah and Hamas – and treat this as confidential.’ We agreed, and went to see Amr Moussa (now a post-revolution Egyptian presidential candidate) at the Arab League. He was at first very cautious – but the next day, Amr Moussa’s team was very positive. We said: ‘Give it a chance – we said that the Arab League was created for Palestine, that the Arab League has a big role in Jerusalem’.”

The delegation went to see Nabil al-Arabi at the Egyptian foreign ministry. “Al-Arabi said: ‘Can I bring in the foreign minister of Turkey, who happens to be in Egypt?’ So we all talkled about the initiative together. We noticed the close relationship between the foreign ministry and the intelligence ministry. That’s how I found out that ‘new’ Egypt had a lot of confidence – they were talking in front of Turkey; they wanted (italics: wanted) to talk in front of Turkey. So we agreed we would all talk together and then I returned with the others to Amman at 9.0 pm.”

The team went to the West Bank to report – “we were happy, we never had this feeling before” – and tell Azzam Ahmed (Fatah’s head of reconciliation) that they intended to support Mahmoud Abbas’s initiative over Gaza. “We had seven big meetings in Palestine to put all the groups there and the independents in the picture. Abbas had already given us a presidential decree. I spoke to Khaled Meshaal (head of Hamas, living in Damascus) by phone. He said: ‘Does Abu Mazzen (Abbas) agree to this?’ I said that wasn’t the point. I went to Damascus next day with Hanna Nasser, Mahdi Abdul Hadi and Hanni Masri. Because of all the trouble in Syria, we had to make a detour around Deraa. I had a good rapport with Meshaal. He said he had read our document – and that it was worth looking at.”

It was a sign of the mutual distrust between Hamas and Abbas that they both seemed intent on knowing the other’s reaction to the initiative before making up their own minds. “Meshaal said to me: ‘What did Abu Mazzen (Abbas) say?’ I laughed and replied: ‘You always ask me this – but what do you (italics: you) want? We met with Meshaal’s colleagues, Abu Marzouk, Izzat Rishiq and Abu Abdu Rahman. We reviewed the document for six and a half hours. The only thing we didn’t get from Meshaal was that the government has to be by agreement. We told him the government has to be of natiuonal unity -- on the agreement that we would be able to carry out elections and lift the embargo on Gaza and reconstruct Gaza, that we have to abide by international law, by the UN Charter and UN resolutions. He asked for three or four days. He agreed that resistance must only be ‘in the national interest of the country’ – it would have to be ‘aqlaqi’ – ethical. There would be no more rocket attacks on civilians. In other words, no more rocket attacks from Gaza.”

Meshaal told Masri and his friends that he had seen President Bashar Assad of Syria, his vice president Sharaa and Syrian foreign minister Moallem. “He said he wanted their support – but in the end it was the word of the Palestinian people. We were very happy – we said ‘there is a small breakthrough’. Meshaal said: ‘We won’t let you down.’ We said we would communicate all this to Fatah and the independents on the West Bank and to the Egyptians. In the West Bank, Fatah called it the ‘Hamas initiative’ -- but we said no, it is from everybody. After two days, Meshaal said he had spoken to Egyptian intelligence and they like what we have offered.”

The talks had been successful. Meshaal was persuaded to send two of his top men to Cairo. Masri’s team hoped that Abbas would do the same. Four men – two from each side – travelled to Egypt on 22 April. A year earlier, when there was a familiar impasse between the two sides in Egypt, the Moubarak regime tried to place further obstacles between them. Meshaal had fruitlessly met with Omar Sulieman – Mubarak’s intelligence factotum and Israel’s best friend in the Arab world – in Mecca. Sulieman effectively worked for the Israelis. Now all had changed utterly.

On the day Abbas and Meshaal went to Cairo, everyone went except the two rival prime ministers, Fayad and Hanniyeh. Hamas agreed that over the past four years, the Israelis had seized more of Jerusalem and built many more settlements in the occupied West Bank. Meshaal was angry when he thought he would not be allowed to speak from the podium with the others – in the event, he was – and Hamas agreed on the 1967 border, effectively acknowledging Israel’s existence, and to the reference to the ‘resistance’; and to give Abbas more time for negotiation.

If Hamas was in the government, it would have to recognise the State of Israel. But if they were not, they would not recognise anything. “It’s not fair to say ‘Hamas must do the following’, Masri says. “The resistance must also be reciprocal. But as long as they are not in the Palestinian government, Hamas are just a political party and can say anything they want. So America should be prepared to see Hamas ageeeing on the formation of the government. That government will abide by UN resolutions – and international law. It’s got to be mutual. Both sides realised they might miss the boat of the Arab spring. It wasn’t me who did this – it was a compilation of many efforts. If it was not for Egypt and the willingness of the two Palestinian groups, this would not have happened.” In the aftermath of the agreement, Hamas and Abbas’ loyalists agreed to stop arresting members of each side.

The secret story of Palestinian unity is now revealed. Israeli prime minister Netanyahu’s reaction to the news – having originally refused to negotiate with Palestinians because they were divided – was to say that he would not talk to Abbas if Hamas came into the Palestinian government. President Obama virtually dismissed the Palestinian unity initiative. But 1967 borders means that Hamas is accepting Israel and the ‘resistance’ initiative means an end to Gaza rockets on Israel. International law and UN resolutions mean peace can be completed and a Palestinian state brought into being. That, at least, is the opinion of both Palestinian sides. The world will wait to see if Israel will reject it all again.

The P.L.O. and Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation: What does it all mean?

The PLO and Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation: What does it all mean?

The Arab world is undergoing a rapid change; a democratic tide is sweeping through the region, and the Arab people are demanding reforms and political freedoms from their governments. Palestine is no different. For years, the Palestinian people have been politically divided. Recent demonstrations throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have called for an end to these divisions, which have negatively impacted the ability of Palestinians to confront their problems united. In response to the legitimate aspirations of our people, major Palestinian political factions came together last week, and agreed to end the divisions and work to bring freedom and dignity to the Palestinian people. This agreement will positively impact the Palestinian people, and will advance the quest for peace and independence. Reconciliation should not be viewed as a threat or a risk, because without uniting our ranks, the Palestinian leadership cannot reach an agreement to end the conflict.

• What does the reconciliation agreement entail?

The reconciliation agreement calls for the formation of an independent government of technocrats for a period of one year, NOT a unity government as has been mistakenly stated by some in the US and Israel. This government’s primary mandate is to prepare for legislative and presidential elections in May 2012, and to rebuild the Gaza Strip, still in ruins more than 2 years after Israel’s assault. It will have no role in negotiations or political issues, which rest firmly in the hands of the PLO. President Abbas, who remains President of the Palestinian National Authority, will continue to implement his political agenda, and the interim government will adhere to all previous agreements and commitments the PLO signed with Israel. Basically, the mandate of the interim government will not vary significantly from the one currently in place.

• Who will lead this government?

The Palestinian Government is mandated by our constitution, the Basic Law. As such, it will remain President Abbas's government, and will implement his agenda. All members of the new cabinet in the interim government, including the Prime Minister, must be approved by President Abbas.

• What does this mean for the negotiations process?

The PLO, headed by President Abbas, who is also the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, will continue to handle all political and negotiation issues. The PLO, as re-iterated recently by President Abbas, is still committed to all agreements previously signed with Israel, which call for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The PLO will NOT change its position. The reconciliation agreement signed last week will have no impact on negotiations.

• What role will Hamas play in policy-making?

None. The reconciliation agreement is solely a framework agreement to prepare the occupied Palestine territory for elections and to rebuild the Gaza Strip. Policy-making remains in the hands of President Abbas and his cabinet, who remain committed to building the institutions of the Palestinian state and achieving a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

• What about security?

Current security arrangements on the ground will not be affected. One aspect of the agreement is to establish a committee to define the role of Palestinian Security Forces after the elections of May 2012. The efforts of the PNA, with the support of the US, to build a professional, capable security system will continue, and there are no plans to abandon the model we have been using successfully. Palestinian Security Forces will continue to protect Palestinian citizens, and affirm the rule of law and stability in Palestinian territories under our control.

In light of the above, calls in Washington to cut off aid do not have a legal basis. Hamas will not be a part of the Palestinian government or the PLO during this transitional period, and the Palestinian leadership remains committed to a peaceful resolution to the conflict. It defeats the purpose of US objectives in the region to undermine the PNA and PLO at this critical juncture. In fact, this reconciliation provides an important opportunity for the US, Israel, and the entire world to advance efforts to achieve peace in the region.

http://plodelegation.us/?p=574

At Last! Palestine's first home game

From a well-known football (soccer) magazine called Fourfourtwo (FFT) based in the UK, May 2011 issue:

"After decades of playing in exile, the Knights have finally come home. Muddy and bruised, FFT squeezed its way into their historic 2012 qualifier.

Palestinian football has come a long way since the country's FA (Football Association) was dissolved in 1948, after the creation of the state of Israel and the ISrael FA in its place. The Palestine FA was reformed in exile in 1962 and recognized by FIFA in 1998 - virtually Sepp Blatter's first act as FIFA president. As ever, Blatter's decision was not without controversy. You cannot have a national team without a representative state, said critics, but whatever you think of Blatter, he has always promoted football as an agent for social and political change. A national football team is as potent a symbol of statehood as a flag or anthem and Blatter encouraged Palestine's nascent team morally and financially while the world turned its back. As Palestine was rocked by the second conflict (intifada) with Israel, the Knights played football in exile, rising to 118 in the FIFA rankings five years ago. Palestine's women's team are currently in the top 100.

Now, with talks of declarations of statehood in the air, the Palestine team has come home. A friendly was played with Jordan in October 2008, but never have they hosted a competitive match until now. In June they will start qualification for the 2014 World Cup on home soil and the Asian Football Confederation has said that all matches involving Palestinian teams under its jurisdiction will be played here. "It's the story of a fight, a bureaucratic difficulties, and of kids loving the game," says the superbly-named Jerome Champagne, adviser to the Palestine FA and until recently one of Blatter's closest aides. "The Thailand match is very important, not only for Palestinian football, but for the fight to create a Palestinian state."

The significance of the team's return to home soil cannot be overstated. In the temporary capital, Ramallah, just a few miles from Gaza, normalcy prevades. You can buy a beer; watch a Champions League match in a bar. There is a five-star hotel. There are no guns. There is a determination to show the rest of the world that despite everything, Palestine is normal. Football plays a big part in that.

"Football is much, much more than a game," says Champagne. "Bill Shankly said football is more than just a question of life and death. Here, football is fundamental for kids to have fun, discipline and education. But it is definitely much more than just a game." In a hotel basement, the Palestinian FA president, Jibril Rajoub, is holding court. A bear of a man, he speaks in a curt, deliberate manner that demands attention, thudding his fist against the table for emphasis. He simultaneously glowers and mocks and charms. He tells FFT he hasn't slept in three nights, so busy is he getting everything ready for the game. The strain shows across his weathered face. "Politics has nothing to do with sport," Rajoub pronounces, but then embarks on a 40-minute lecture telling us why sport is so intrinsically entwined with the country's political landscape. "You will never meet a Palestinian without having involvement in direct or indirect political activities," he admits.

Rajoub is also a senior figure within political party Fatah - the largest faction of the PLO - and once served as Yasser Arafat's national security adviser. Aged 58, he has dedicated his life to the cause of Palestinian freedom and served 17 years in as Israeli jail. Here, he learned Hebrew and English and rose through the Fatah ranks on his release into exile in 1988. He says that violence is part of the past and that the Palestinian struggle has moved on. "The world has changed, what was good last century is not suitable this century."

One of Fatah's policies in the West Bank has been to implement a bottom-up approach towards statehood, improving the quality of life and building institutions. The belief is that by creating normalcy, the case for independence becomes irresistible. "It is a rational decision to expose the Palestinian cause through sport, therough football, through the ethics and values of the game," says Rajoub. "I do believe that it is the right way to pave the way for statehood for our people." With such high stakes imposed from the top, the burden of responsibility rests heavily on the young shoulders of the Palestinian Olympic team. But then few footballers understand their duties to their compatriots as inherently as Palestine's. "We have 100 per cent responsibility to paint a smile on the faces of each Palestinian man, women, boy or girl, wherever they are," says defender Nadeem Basem Barghot. He says Palestinians all over the world, including the refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon, will be tuning in to the game.

The players are paid just under £2,000 a year and put up in dormitories situated in the eaves of the Faisal al-Husseini Stadium. FFT is shown the accomodaions: it would be inconceivable to Europe's mega-rich stars. Conditions are basic, but the Palestinian FA are proud of how far they have come. Five years ago the stadium was razed by Israeli forces, the pitch used as a parking lot for tanks as they engaged in a major campaign of West Bank incursions.

Barghot says the team's "main problem" is harrassment and interference from Israel. For the Thailand game the Palestine coach Mokhtar Tlili called up 12 players from Gaza, but only 4 were allowed to cross over. "We don't meet all the time so don't have proper team harmony," says Barghot. "Other problems are when the Israelis don't give permission to leave the Palestinian territories [for matches]. We must wait for permissions before we decide the team." The players shyly deflect questions about their personal struggles under occupation.

According to left-wing Israeli human rights group B'tselem, 6,330 Palestinians in the occupied territories have died at the hand of Israeli security forces in the last 10 years. "Every player in the squad," says a Palestine FA official, "will have lost at least one family member, or know someone who has died in the conflict with Israel."

So that's the build up and the background, but what about the match itself? Palestine, trailing 1-0 from the first leg, tear into Thailand but despite creating several clear-cut chances, lack the craft and guile to score. The absence of their eight Gazan players is telling. However, it is one of those permitted to cross between the occupied terrirtories who makes a breakthrough shortly after half-time. Abdulhamid Abuhabib strikes a sweet 25-yard volley that soars into the top corner of the Thailand goal, sending the crowd into raptures. But as wind and rain lash the stadium in to second half, the players freeze. Hailstones pummel the open terraces and the crowd thins. Thailand have a man sent off, but the breakthrough will not come. In the dying moments of normal time, Abuhabib sends a diving header wide with the goal at his mercy. Extra-time beckons, and the temperature plumets further. As penalties near, we are joined in the press box by an unexpected visitor. "It it goes to penalties I'll be too nervous to watch," Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad tells an incredulous FFT. "I'll look the other way." It gets even more surreal when a piper, dressed in bright yellow waterproofs like a trawlerman, joins us and leads the Prime Minister in a round of patriotic chanting.

Abuhabib might have spared his leader the pain of a shootout, but sends a spectacular bicycle kick over the crossbar in the last minute. Spot-kicks follow. Both teams score their first five, but Palestine miss both their sudden-death penalties and Thailand prevail 6-5. Afterwards the mood is bittersweet. Barghot, like several of his colleagues, leave the field in tears. But the belief lingers what has passed has a signifcance far beyond football. "Today was a political victory,but I wish it was a football victory too," says Coach Tlili. "The world now will see Palestine in different eyes - in sport's eyes," says Rajoub. " This is a new launch for the Palestinian people toward freedom and independence."

__________________________________________

Next up: Israel?
After years of conflict, hopes are high that Palestine will eventually meet their neighbors on the football pitch

Most of the world's great adversaries have come face to face on the pitch. Iran faced the USA at the 1998 World Cup in a tepid encounter. Iran and Iraq routinely meet, most recently at the AFC Asian Cup in Qatar, as do Serbia and other remnants of the former Yugoslavia. Last year, South Korea pitched (unsuccessfully) to host the 2022 World Cup, with North Korea slated to host some matches. Israel have even played tournaments in Iran. But what of Israel and Palestine? Because they play in different confederations it is unlikely they will ever meet unless their two federations agree a friendly.

"As soon as the occupation disappears I don't see any reason not to have a friendly match between us and the Israelis," says PFA president, Jibril Rajoub. "Before the end of occupation? No way."